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Consumer Financed Export Subsidies and the Agreement on Agriculture 
 
Current agricultural trade negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) call for an elimination of export subsidies. But the current language on export subsidies 
in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture omits an important implicit export subsidy in 
the form of price discrimination with or without revenue pooling. In either case, the export 
subsidy can be called ‘consumer only financed’. Two recent high profile trade disputes brought 
before the WTO concluded that price discrimination with or without price pooling constituted an 
export subsidy (WTO, 1999, 2004). As a result, both Canadian dairy and EU sugar export 
subsidies were deemed to be above that scheduled in the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA). The 
WTO rulings based their decision on cross-subsidization as defined by Tangermann (1997) 
where price support within quotas has the effect of covering fixed costs while above-quota 
production can be sold even if the price received for it covers only marginal cost of production. 
Tangermann (1997) also includes the export subsidy effect of revenue pooling in his definition of 
cross-subsidization.  
In this paper, we develop a general theoretical framework that identifies the elements of 
export subsidies with or without revenue pooling. In cases were there is no revenue pooling, we 
show that infra-marginal transfers to producers “cross-subsidizes” production and hence act as a 
trade distorting subsidy even if the extra-marginal output itself is not exported. This is because 
declining average costs offset losses on the margin at world prices. Infra-marginal support also 
distorts output by deterring exit as high cost firms would not be in business otherwise. Price 
discrimination with revenue pooling is shown not only to be an export subsidy but is more trade 
distorting than an equivalent taxpayer financed export subsidy. Again, revenue pooling distorts 
trade even if the product is not exported. To illustrate the importance of these two types of trade   3 
distorting consumer financed support schemes, we determine the empirical effects of such 
support in the U.S. dairy industry were elements of both infra-marginal support and price 
discrimination with price pooling exist.    
The importance of cross-subsidization due to infra-marginal support cannot be 
underestimated as countries have moved towards more ‘decoupled’ support programs. As for 
price pooling, there are many other examples of government regulations that generate such types 
of export subsidies (Dixit and Josling, 1997). We extend the standard analysis of revenue pooling 
(Alston and Gray, 1998) by allowing for a consumer only financed export subsidy when part of 
domestic consumption occurs at world prices. The higher the share of domestic production 
consumed at the world price, the smaller the trade distortion and thus it is possible that distortion 
is less than that of a taxpayer financed equivalent export subsidy. We show that the extent of the 
trade distortion depends on the relative demand elasticities, the proportion of total production 
consumed domestically of the traded good, the elasticity of supply, the level of farm price 
desired, and the price gap between the exported and domestically consumed good. 
The WTO dispute for Canadian dairy involved both price discrimination and revenue 
pooling while the EU sugar case involved cross-subsidization resulting from infra-marginal 
support only. The WTO’s definition of an export subsidy is incomplete because consumer only 
financed export subsidies (1) are not recognized with revenue pooling under some 
circumstances;  and (2) includes infra-marginal support that possibly distorts trade less than the 
revenue pooling case. This is because of an excessive reliance on the notion of “contingent on 
exports” rather than on the underlying characteristics of an export subsidy that has production 
expanding and consumption contracting simultaneously. The definition of an export subsidy in 
the GATT 1994 leaves room for loopholes, circumvention, and misinterpretation of what an   4 
export subsidy is and should be more specific on those policies that have the dual effect of 
contracting domestic consumption and escalating domestic production. This definition would 
provide a solid basis to recognize different types of export subsidies that are not now explicitly 
listed, including a consumer only financed export subsidy. 
This paper is organized as follows: the next section looks at the legal details of the 
Canadian dairy and EU sugar cases. Section 3 outlines the economics of cross-subsidization and 
revenue pooling. Section 4 provides some empirical evidence using infra-marginal subsidies and 
revenue pooling in the U.S. dairy sector as an example. The final section concludes. 
2.  Legal Aspects of the Canadian Dairy and EU Sugar cases  
Canada dairy policy 
In Canada, approximately 40 percent of the milk produced is consumed as fluid milk, while 
roughly 5-10 percent of the remaining milk processed into dairy products is exported (CDC, 
2004). Overall, Canada is a net exporter of dairy products both in value and in quantity. Dairy 
policy is governed by the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) which administers a national 
production quota system and sets the target price for fluid milk. 
   Between the years of 1974 and 1995, there was a penalty for both overproduction and 
underproduction. The penalty for underproduction was the loss of revenue that could have 
otherwise been earned, while the penalty for overproduction was a levy placed on out-of-quota 
milk. In addition, there was a producer financed export subsidy, which was funded by a levy 
placed on all in-quota milk and the levy on out-of-quota milk production. The producer levies 
acted as an export subsidy since the payment or export refund was contingent on exports; it also 
lead to a price gap between the price domestic consumers paid and the price producers received.   5 
In 1995, Canadian dairy policy was modified as a result of the AOA, which required 
member nations to curtail domestic support and export subsidies that were tied directly to 
production. The production quota remained in place. However, the producer financed export 
subsidy was eliminated and a new classified pricing system was developed, referred to as the 
“Special Milk Classes”. The system created five classes of fluid milk, Classes I-V. The WTO 
dispute focused on Class V only, which contained three major subclasses: Class Vabc (some 
domestic and all export sales are at the world price with pooling); Class Vd (export sales that are 
from in-quota production and revenues are pooled with domestic sales); and Class Ve (no price 
pooling and all over-quota production is exported where the marginal cost of production equals 
the world price). 
EU sugar policy 
The EU sugar policy also operates under a classified pricing system and a production quota. 
When first introduced, sugar produced in the EU fell into one of two categories, A or B. Classes 
A and B encompassed all sugar produced with in the limits of the production quota. In-quota 
sugar was either sold domestically at the high guaranteed price or exported. Exported A and B 
sugar received an export refund which was financed via producer levies placed on domestically 
sold A and B sugar. The levies placed on B sugar exceed the levies placed on A sugar. The role 
of B sugar was to act as surplus margin. The existence of the B quota allowed producers to fill 
their A quota without the risk of being penalized for overproduction.   
The first major modification of the policy occurred in 1975 after the UK’s accession. At 
that time, the CMO acquired the UK’s commitments to certain ACP countries. The resulting 
ACP Protocol opened the EU market to imported sugar cane. In addition, the ACP Protocol 
guaranteed the EU support price for sugar imported from those countries named in the   6 
agreement. Increased openness ultimately created the need to export sugar produced in excess of 
demand. Furthermore, class C was introduced in the mid-1980s when B quotas were 
permanently set at given production levels. The role initially assigned to B sugar was eventually 
taken over by C sugar or out-of-quota sugar. There were no quotas associated with C sugar.  
Growers producing C sugar had three options: 1) export it at the world price, 2) carry forward it 
to the next marketing year, or 3) sell it to domestic processors at a low negotiated price. Note that 
the main difference between Canadian Class Ve milk and EU class C sugar was that EU C sugar 
could be carried forward. Canadian milk producers did not have this option, since fluid milk is 
highly perishable.  
EU sugar policy is further complicated by the ACP Protocol, Special Preferential Sugar 
(SPS), and agreements with India. These agreements set a guaranteed minimum price for a 
predetermined quantity of sugar imported from signor countries. The set minimum price received 
by the signor countries is the guaranteed EU internal price which exceeds the world price.  
Therefore, in some countries, domestically produced sugar is exported to the EU and sugar is 
then purchased on the world market to satisfy domestic demand in the signor country. In some 
instances, the sugar purchased in the world market is class C sugar exported from the EU. Thus, 
the result is a triangular trade pattern. 
The second main policy modification occurred in 1995 as a result of the AOA, which 
placed limitations on export refunds given to producers. In addition, there was a reduction in the 
production quota. However, the underlying policy remained virtually unchanged. Unlike 
Canadian dairy, the producer financed export subsidy remained in place.  
 
   7 
Understanding of WTO Legal Texts 
In December of 1997, the US and New Zealand filed claims with the WTO regarding Canada’s 
failure to comply with their obligations outlined in the AOA and GATT 1994. The claimants 
specifically cited Articles 3, 8, 9, and 10 of the AOA (WTO, 1997). In addition, the claimants 
argued that Canada had also violated the schedule of concessions as well as the Article 3 of the 
SCM Agreement.  
The Canadian case went on for several years. The results of the first panel were appealed. 
New Zealand and the US requested that a second dispute settlement panel be assembled, since 
they believed that actions taken by Canada to come into compliance remained in violation of its 
obligations. The arguments in the second case mimicked those of the first dispute, with the 
exception of an additional argument of cross-subsidization. The EU sugar case soon followed in 
which cross-subsidization was the central argument.  
Article 1 of the AOA provides the “Definition of Terms” for export subsidies. Article 1(c) 
defines the term “budgetary outlays” to include revenue foregone, meaning that the government 
can finance an export subsidy simply by not collecting a tax or levy. The inclusion of revenue 
foregone in the definition of budgetary outlay is important to both Canadian dairy and the EU 
sugar disputes, since none of the policies in question involved a charge to the public account. 
Export subsidies can be financed via producer or consumer transfers as well. Article 1(e) defines 
exports subsidies as “subsidies contingent upon export performance” including those subsidies 
explicitly listed in Article 9 of the AOA. The phrase contingent upon export performance indicates 
that a producer must engage in export activities in order to reap the benefits of the subsidy. We 
show export subsidies can occur even if without export contingency. In both disputes, over quota 
production had to be exported and thus the payment was contingent on exports. While Article 1 is   8 
not explicitly stated in the claimants’ petition, it appears frequently throughout the disputes as the 
source of numerous definitional arguments. 
The “Definition of a Subsidy” appears only in Article 1 of the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement defines a 
subsidy as requiring a benefit to be conferred. In each of the disputes, the panels had to first 
determine whether the payment or benefit constituted a subsidy in order to determine if the 
payment constituted an export subsidy.  
Article 9 of the AOA identifies export subsidies subject to reduction commitments. Article 
9.1(a) consists of three aspects. First, it indicates that support does not have to be provided directly 
by the government. Support can also be provided by a governmental agency, including marketing 
boards. This is particularly important for the Canadian dairy cases, in which the panel determined 
that the CDC was an agency of the government. Furthermore, Article 9.1(a) states that direct 
subsidies including payments-in-kinds are also subject to reduction commitments.
1 It also reiterates 
that export subsidies subjected to reduction are those subsidies contingent upon export 
performance. Article 9.1(c) states that export subsidies do not require budgetary outlays to be 
subject to reduction commitments; payments financed by virtue of governmental action not 
involving a charge to the public account, are also subject to reduction. This includes producer and 
consumer financed support. 
Article 3 of the AOA indicates that a member country must not provide export subsidies in 
excess of specified budgetary outlays or quantity level commitments outlined in the countries 
reduction schedule. While Article 8 of the AOA prohibits member countries from providing export 
subsidies not in conformity with the AOA. Article 10 of the AOA addresses issues associated with 
circumvention of a member’s outlined reduction commitments. Article 10.1 states that export 
                                                 
1 The first Canadian dairy case also involved payments-in-kind to processors in the form of lower prices.   9 
subsidies not explicitly prohibited that attempt to circumvent reduction commitments are also 
prohibited. Article 10.3 places the burden of proof on the defendant.  Any exports in excess of the 
reduction commitment amount are assumed to have been subsidized unless the defendant provides 
proof to the contrary. Both countries were exporting at quantities well above the levels specified 
in their schedule of concessions. Hence, the defendants assumed the burden of proof pursuant to 
Article 10.3 of the AOA.  
The claimants utilized two main strategies in the disputes, focusing on theses Articles. 
They first argued that the alleged export subsidies were prohibited under both the SCM 
Agreement and the AOA. The claimants argued that alleged export subsidies circumvented 
commitments outlined in the AOA. The second argument was that if the alleged export subsidies 
were not prohibited under the SCM Agreement or the AOA, then they should be included in the 
schedule of concessions. Since both countries were exporting above their scheduled levels, 
including the subsidies in the schedule of concessions would cause both countries to be over 
their limits, thus in violation of the AOA 
In both the EU and Canadian cases, the panels first had to decide whether the product(s) in 
question fell under the jurisdiction of the AOA in accordance with Article 2 and Annex 1 of the 
AOA. The next aspect of the dispute considered by the panel in the Canadian dairy case was 
whether the CDC was a governmental agency. Once the CDC was deemed to be an agency of the 
government, then its actions fell under the jurisdiction of the AOA. Next, the panels had to decide 
if the alleged export subsidies were actually export subsidies. The panel for the Canadian dairy 
case defined the term payment as requiring a benefit to be conferred. Furthermore, that benefit 
had to have been award to exports, thus the payment was said to be contingent on exports. The 
EU sugar panel determined that an export subsidy required three things: (1) a payment to be   10 
made, (2) that payment to be made on exports, and (3) the payment to be financed by virtue of 
the government. However, the payment did not have to result in a charge to the public account.  
The identification of an export subsidy by means of payment, benefit, or export contingency is 
somewhat misleading as will we show in the subsequent sections.  
Once it was determined that a “payment” or “benefit” had been conferred and that 
payment/benefit constituted an export subsidy, then the panels’ duty was to determined whether 
the export subsidy was an acceptable export subsidy. If the export subsidy was administered in a 
manner consistent with the AOA, then the panel’s discussion turned to whether it was in 
compliance with the member country’s schedule of concessions. If the export subsidy was not 
administered in a manner consistent with the Article 9 of the AOA, then the panel had to decide if 
the export subsidy was generally prohibited, constituted circumvention or both.  
Canadian Dairy Case 
Essentially, the complainants argued that if the “special milk classes” scheme was consistent with 
Article 9 of the AOA, then the resulting subsidies should have been counted against Canada’s 
export subsidy reduction commitments, otherwise the resulting subsidies were prohibited or 
constituted circumvention.   
Canada claimed that the special class scheme did not confer a benefit to producers. Thus, 
it was not a subsidy in the sense of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement and therefore it could not be 
considered an export subsidy (WTO, 1999). Furthermore, Canada argued that no budgetary 
outlays occurred; hence, the special class scheme could not be deemed an export subsidy under 
Article 9 of the AOA. Canada argued that the CDC was not a governmental agency, maintaining 
that government merely provided the framework for the organization. However, the CCD had 
filed notification as a State Trading Enterprise under Article 17 of GATT 1994 on September 29,   11 
1995, several years prior to the dispute (WTO). The panel ruled that the CDC was an agency of 
the Canadian government, and thus its (subsidizing) actions must be in compliance with the 
WTO legal texts.  
Discussion then turned to what constituted “payments”. The panel used domestic price as 
the criterion for determining whether exports received a payment; products sold globally below 
the domestic price were deemed to have received an export subsidy (WTO, 1999).   
Once it was established that a payment had been rendered, talks turn to its source of 
financing. All parties agreed that no government funds were directly involved. However, the 
panel held that by granting the CDC the exclusive rights to govern milk production, the Canadian 
government indirectly provided the export subsidy on Class Ve and Class Vd milk. The export 
subsidy was received in the form of high domestic prices resulting from the revenue pooling 
scheme. Thus, the export subsidy was “financed by virtue of governmental action”. High 
domestic prices received by the farms for domestically sold milk enabled them to sell exports 
well below the domestic price in the world market. Furthermore, the panel held that the export 
subsidy was contingent on exports, since the farm had to be an exporter in order to receive the 
benefits. The panel also found that Canada had acted inconsistently with its obligations under the 
Article 3 and 9 of the AOA.  
The panel determined Class Vd and Class Ve to be export subsidies, but not Class Vabc 
because the latter could also be accessed by processors for the domestic market and was not 
“contingent upon export performance.” Class Vd and Ve provided a lower price to exporters than 
could have been obtained from other sources and was supplied through a government sanctioned 
system. Milk sold at the world price, below domestic prices, was deemed to be a “preferential” 
price because it required farmers to “share the cost” of selling milk at a price lower than the   12 
pooled price from domestic sales. The WTO ruled that such a scheme is a producer financed 
export subsidy because farmers had to “forgo revenue” to provide the subsidy and it was 
“contingent on exports”. We will show at the export subsidy was actually consumer only 
financed in the form of higher domestic consumer prices. In addition, we will show Class Vabc 
was also subsidized since revenue pooling acts as an export subsidy even if part of the output is 
sold domestically at world prices.  
Canada appealed the decision. The appellate body ruled that the panel failed to 
appropriately identify what constituted a payment in the sense of Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement (WTO, 1999). The appellate body held that the appropriate benchmark to determine 
whether a payment had been rendered was the cost of production (COP) and not domestic price. 
If sales occurred below the COP production, then those units were deemed to have received a 
payment.    
Canada argued that individual producer’s information should be used rather than industry 
figures, arguing that the use of industry figure could result in the observance of export sales 
below COP, while in reality only low cost producers engage in exportation at the world price. 
Furthermore, there was a debate regarding what should be included in the calculation of COP. 
Canada argued that quota rights constituted intangible assets and could not be accurately 
incorporated into the COP calculation and therefore should not be included in the calculation. 
Ultimately the panel determined that quota rights could be amortized using Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
The appellate body was unable to determine whether payments were made in accordance 
with Article 9.1(c). Therefore, the appellate body was unable to determine whether the special 
class scheme was inconsistent with the Article 3 or Article 9 of the AOA.    13 
New Zealand and the US requested that second dispute settlement panel be assembled, 
since they believed that actions taken by Canada to come into compliance remained in violation 
of the AOA. The argument utilized in the second Canadian dairy case mimicked the arguments 
used in the first case. However, one additional argument was added; the argument of cross-
subsidization or export subsidies resulting from the domestic production quota.  
The term cross-subsidization appeared for the first time in the Canadian dairy dispute as a 
footnote in the Final Panel Report 1999. The footnote highlights the fact that cross-subsidizes 
have never been formally addressed in any of the numerous WTO legal texts and the definition 
has never been formally agreed upon by the members of the WTO. It also states that cross-
subsidization results from either over-quota production sold at world market prices operating 
under a production quota or from revenue pooling. The Canadian dairy industry had both a 
production quota with above-quota output sold at world market prices and price pooling 
arrangements. Tangermann (1997) proposed that cross-subsidies resulting from either a 
production quota or revenue pooling fall under existing regulations pursuant to the Article 10 of 
the AOA and that such policies constitute circumvention, particularly if the policy was 
introduced after the Uruguay Round.   
 The panel held that the cross-subsidies, resulting from the sale of domestic milk at high 
prices with exports being sold at world prices, were inconsistent with the Article 9.1(c) of the 
AOA. In addition, they deemed the resulting export subsidy to be contingent on export 
performance and therefore a violation of Article 9.1(a) of the AOA. Furthermore, the panel 
found the subsidy structure to be a violation of Article 10 and 9 of the AOA.  
Canada appealed the decision for a second time, arguing that the term cross-subsidization 
was “foreign” and an “open ended notion”. The appellate body upheld the panel’s decision that   14 
the special milk classes and the cross-subsidies resulting from the production quota were 
inconsistent with Article 3, 8 and 9 of the AOA, citing cross-subsidization as the reason. They 
declined to rule on Article 10.1 or circumvention.  
The appellate body’s ruling provided validity to the utilization of cross-subsidization as a 
viable legal argument in WTO disputes. The EU sugar case soon followed.  
EU Sugar Case 
In September of 2002, Brazil and Australia brought charges before the WTO dispute settlement 
body against the EU sugar regime. Many of the legal arguments were the same as those utilized 
in the second Canadian dairy case, with cross-subsidization as the central argument. 
The complainants asked the panel to consider four payments which they believed 
to be in violation of the EU reduction agreements: (1) payments in the form of below cost 
C beet sales to C sugar producer/exporters, (2) payments in the form of cross-
subsidization resulting from the profits made on the sale of A and B quota sugar used to 
cover fixed costs of the production/exportation of C sugar, (3) payments in the form of C 
sugar below the total COP, and (4) payments in the form of high prices by consumers.  
The panel chose to only consider payments of the type (1) and (2). 
2 
The dispute settlement panel clearly outlined its interpretation of Article 9.1(a) of 
the AOA. The panel interpreted these provisions to require three distinct elements: (1) 
“payments” to be made, (2) those payments to be made on exports, and (3) those 
payments to be “financed by virtue of governmental action”. Like the appellate body in 
the first Canadian dairy dispute, the panel concluded that average total cost of production 
should be used as the benchmark for determining whether a “payment” had been made. 
                                                 
2 The panel found the subsidies given to processors in the form of low prices and export refunds given to ACP/India 
equivalent sugar to be a violation of the AOA since they exceed reduction commitments.   15 
Any sales below the average total cost of production were deemed to have a received a 
payment. Since these sales consisted of exports, it was ruled that the payment was made 
on exports and was therefore a violation of Article 9.1(a) of the AOA. Again, although 
the production quota did not involve a charge to the public account it was deem to in 
violation of Article 9 of the AOA. 
The EU claims that it did not know at the time of scheduling that C sugar and ACP 
equivalent sugar received a subsidy. Therefore, it was not included in their schedule of 
concessions. They argued that had they known that subsidies awarded to C and ACP equivalent 
sugar should have been included in the reduction schedule at the time of scheduling, then their 
reduction figures would have taken on different values. The EU argued that they should be 
allowed to change their reduction schedule in light of this information (WTO, 2004).    
The defendants in both the second Canadian dairy and the EU sugar disputes argued that 
cross-subsidization was an open-ended notion and foreign concept. Both countries argued that 
the definition of cross-subsidization had not been agreed upon by WTO members. The lawyers 
for the EU sugar case asserted that cross-subsidization could not be explained using economic 
theory (McNelis, 2005). Moreover, they argued that the effects of cross-subsidization could not 
be measured using econometrics or empirical analysis. We have shown that cross-subsidization 
is driven by declining average costs and can be measured empirically (de Gorter, Just and Kropp 
2007). 
The panel ruled pursuant to Article 10.1 of the AOA that the EU did not prove that class 
C sugar was not subsidized (WTO, 2004). Furthermore, the panel ruled that C sugar received an 
export subsidy, citing cross-subsidization as the source. The panel found that exported C sugar 
was cross-subsidized by the high guaranteed prices paid for A and B sugar. The panel did not   16 
rule on the claims that the export subsidy was prohibited under the SCM Agreement under 
judicial economy; if it could be established that an export subsidy occurred in violation of one 
agreement, it was unnecessary to prove it in violation of the second agreement. 
The ruling ordered the EU to bring its sugar policy in compliance with its obligations 
under the AOA immediately. In addition, the panel ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to 
allow the EU to reschedule its reduction commitments (WTO, 2004). Any rescheduling 
negotiations must occur in multilateral forum, perhaps the upcoming Doha Round. The panel 
urged the EU to honor commitments to ACP developing countries and India.   
The EU sugar case was also appealed. The appellate body upheld all of the rulings of 
panel, expect for the panel’s use of judicial economy (WTO, 2005). The appellate body ruled 
that the panel had an obligation under the Dispute Settlement Understanding to investigate all 
claims submitted by the complaining party. The appellate body was not in a position to conduct 
the necessary legal analysis; therefore, they declined to rule on claims pursuant to the SCM 
Agreement.  
  Thus, WTO has ruled price discrimination with or without revenue pooling constitutes 
export subsidies. The next sections explain how these two forms of cross-subsidization lead to 
trade distortion.  
3.  The essential economics of consumer financed export subsidies 
There are two types of consumer financed export subsidies: price discrimination only with higher 
prices for infra-marginal output; and price discrimination with revenue pooling. We will show 
that either case can be more distorting than a taxpayer financed export subsidy. 
 
   17 
Infra-marginal support 
In the traditional literature, infra-marginal support is deemed to have no effect on the level of 
output because it does not influence production decisions on the margin (e.g., Borges and 
Thurman, 1994; Rucker, Thurman, and Sumner, 1995; and Sumner and Wolf, 1996). Chau and 
de Gorter (2005) showed that cross-subsidization can effect exit decisions and thus distort trade. 
Here, we show how infra-marginal support cross-subsidizes lower priced output by deterring exit 
and by expanding output beyond the infra-marginal level receiving support (de Gorter, Just and 
Kropp 2007). 
Suppose the infra-marginal subsidy is already in place, and there are i = 1,…,n farms in 
the industry. Farms receive a target price (T) on a limited amount of output (Bi), with T being 
greater than the prevailing market price. The target price is achieved through a transfer from 
consumers (e.g., a production quota). We define Qi* as the “natural” level of output where price 
equals marginal costs. It is assumed that Bi is always less than Qi*. 
The key to understanding cross-subsidization is to distinguish those farms that are in 
business regardless of the infra-marginal subsidy from those that are in business only because of 
it. We therefore adopt the following notation: 
  { } |farm   produces regardless of the infra-marginal subsidy i i Φ =  
  { } |farm   produces only with the infra-marginal subsidy i i Ψ =  
Farms in set Ф are in business regardless of the subsidy and always produce at Qi*. But farms in 
the set Ψ may produce at Qi* or Bi.
3 Therefore, define 
  { }
*
1 |farm   produces   only with the infra-marginal subsidy i i i Q Ψ =  
  { } 2 |farm   produces   only with the infra-marginal subsidy i i i B Ψ =    18 
We can now define aggregate output of those farms in business regardless of the subsidy as: 
*
i i Q Q
Φ
∈Φ =∑ .  This represents the free trade level of output (output that would be observed if 
no subsidy was in place).  But this level of production is not observable. Total observed output, 




i i i i Q Q B
Ψ
∈Ψ ∈Ψ = + ∑ ∑ . It follows that Q = Q
Ф + Q
Ψ. The literature to date 
assumes infra-marginal subsidies have no impact on output because marginal decisions are 
unaffected when Bi < Qi* for all i farms. Observed total output is assumed to be the free trade 
output Q
Ф. However, the aggregate observed level of output Q is greater than the hypothetical 
aggregate unobserved free trade level Q
Ф by the amount of output due to farms in business only 
because of the subsidy, namely Q
Ψ.  
To understand how infra-marginal support distorts output, consider Ψ, the set of all farms 
that are in business only because of the infra-marginal subsidy. Assume for the moment that 
production cannot exceed B (omitting the subscript i for now).  We can delineate two subsets of 
farms in Ψ: those with positive profits at B under the subsidy, Ψ
+, and those with negative profits 
when output is at B under the subsidy, Ψ¯. Output distortion equals B for the subset Ψ
+ where 
farms find it profitable to produce at B with the subsidy. Firms that are unprofitable at B (but 
would be profitable at Q* with the subsidy) would have zero production (and distortion) in this 
case.   
Now relax the restriction that output cannot exceed B. Two additional distortions can be 
identified. First, all Ψ
+ farms with positive profits at B will always expand their output to Q
Ψ+, 
the natural level of output where market price equals marginal costs, even though losses are 
incurred on the extra-marginal output (proven mathematically in de Gorter, Just and Kropp 
2007). This means it is always the case that the costs savings due to declining average costs   19 
(increasing returns) of expanding output are greater than the increase in costs from the expanded 
output net of market revenues.
4 Therefore, the distance from B to Q
Ψ+ is additional output 
distortion due to the infra-marginal subsidy for the subset of farms Ψ
+.  
Second, the Ψ¯ farms that are unprofitable with production at B now find it profitable to 
produce at the natural level of output, Q
Ψ¯ in this case, where price equals marginal costs, but 
only because of the infra-marginal subsidy. They enter the industry because the cost savings 
from declining average costs are large enough for these farms to generate a profit at the 
expanded level of output, even though price is below the average cost of production. The 
production of each of these farms increases the gap between observed aggregate production Q
 
and the hypothetical, unobserved aggregate free trade output Q
Ф. Therefore, the literature 
heretofore incorrectly assumes the observed output Q
 equals the hypothetical unobserved free 
trade output Q
Ф when B < Q* for all farms. 
The WTO panel rulings only addressed one aspect of cross-subsidization, or more 
specifically, the move from B to Q
Ψ+, the natural output level for only those farms profitable at 
B, and failed to analyze the output distortions due to exit deterrence: the distance 0 to B for the 
set of farms Ψ
+ that are profitable at B; and the distance 0 to Q
Ψ¯ for the set of farms Ψ¯ that have 
negative profits at the base level B.  In addition to all of this, the WTO panel only evaluated 
cases where prices are below average total costs of production, as variable costs were considered 
explicitly to be covered. We show that cross-subsidization can also occur if world prices are 
below the average variable costs of production. 
Figure 1 depicts the logic where we assume B is less than Q* for all firms. Exit 
deterrence occurs when average costs curves for firms fall between T and Pw (these firms would 
not otherwise be in business). Infra-marginal support deters exit and so this implies that the   20 
observed industry output at world prices is greater than the natural level of output at world prices 
depicted as Q* in figure 1. Furthermore, firms who find it profitable at B (and would not produce 
if no infra-marginal support is forthcoming) will automatically expand to Q*. This is extra-
marginal output due to “cross-subsidization”. Finally, some firms would not find it profitable to 
produce at B (average costs are higher than T) but would find it profitable to produce a higher 
amount at the margin only because of the infra-marginal support. This represents a move from 0 
to Q* in figure 1 and reflects simultaneous exit deterrence and cross-subsidization.  
Now consider an equivalent fully coupled production subsidy generating a price T' 
(where are a equals areas b + c). If there are many firms with average cost curves between T and 
T', it is possible that the infra-marginal support can be more output distorting than the coupled 
subsidy. 
Revenue Pooling 
The case of revenue pooling is well known (Sumner, 1996; Alston and Gray, 1998; Schluep and 
de Gorter, 2001). Price discrimination across markets reduces consumption compared to free 
trade, while farmers facing only the pooled price expand production. Trade distortion is greater 
than a taxpayer financed export subsidy that generates the same level of producer prices. The 
issue is what happens if part of domestic consumption occurs at the world price. This is the case 
for Class Vabc in the Canadian dairy case where the WTO concluded there was no export 
subsidy. However, we show that it can be even more distorting than a taxpayer financed export 
subsidy that achieves the same level of producer price. This is because domestic consumption of 
higher priced products is reduced and with revenues pooled to farmers (from both world and   21 
high domestic prices) production increases above free trade levels.
3 This acts as an export 
subsidy.   
Consider the case in figure 2.  Assume there is only one demand curve given by D1. If no 
price discrimination exists and there was a taxpayer financed per unit export subsidy of Pb - Pw, 
consumer prices equal producer prices at Pb and exports would be X1 (instead of X0 with free 
trade). The trade distortion of X1 – X0 is made up of reduced consumption (C1 – C2) and 
increased production (Q2 – Q1). 
If there is price discrimination with a fixed price Pd resulting in consumption of C'1, and 
the rest of production is exported at world prices, then the new excess supply curve would be 
given by ES2. Producers receive the blend price and production is given by Q2 where average 
revenues equal marginal costs. Exports at X2 imply that the consumer financed export subsidy is 
more trade distorting than a taxpayer financed export subsidy because consumption has been 
reduced further by C2 – C'1. 
Now consider the possibility of domestic consumption at world prices as well. The demand 
curve D2 becomes operational and exports decline by C3. The resulting exports are less than X2, 
greater than X0 but can be greater than or less than X1. The consumer financed export subsidy in 
this case can be less or more distorting than a taxpayer financed export subsidy generating the 
same producer price. In terms of figure 2, ES2 would shift left and intersect the Pb line to the 
right or left of X1. Trade distortion would decline and perhaps be less than the taxpayer financed 
equivalent export subsidy.  The extent of the trade distortion would depend on the relative 
demand elasticities. For example, the more elastic D2, the greater the trade distortion with the 
taxpayer financed export subsidy. It would also depend on the proportion of total production 
                                                 
3 We ignore the production reducing effects of production quotas in Canada.  The analysis here would be more 
applicable to the U.S. dairy policy.   22 
consumed domestically of D2. The higher the proportion of production consumed domestically 
of the good at world prices, the less likely the consumer financed export subsidy is more trade 
distorting. The outcome also depends on the elasticity of supply, the level of farm price desired, 
and the price gap. 
4.  Empirical Example of U.S. Dairy Policies 
This section gives an empirical example of the relative trade distortions arising from revenue 
pooling versus infra-marginal support using U.S. dairy industry data. This sector was chosen for 
the analysis because U.S. dairy policy contains elements of both infra-marginal support and 
revenue pooling. We estimate cost functions by size and region to determine the effects of infra-
marginal subsidies, cross-subsidization, revenue pooling, and an export subsidy on output and 
consumption distortions, using a comparative static analysis.  
The price that U.S. dairy farmers receive is the average of class prices weighted by market 
wide utilization. The blend price is calculated by pooling various classes of milk. Class I consists 
of fluid milk, Classes II, III, IV are product classifications. The 2002 U.S. Farm Bill introduced 
the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program which financially compensates dairy producers 
when domestic milk prices fall below a specified level (USDA, 2002). These counter-cyclical 
payments limit the amount of production eligible to receive the payment to 2.4 million pounds 
per farm per year. Farms are required to produce in order to receive the payment. Therefore, the 
MILC program is a classic example of a taxpayer financed infra-marginal support program. 
Although the MILC program is taxpayer financed, the production effects of the infra-marginal 
payment would be the same if the program was consumer financed. 
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Impact of Infra-marginal Subsidies on Aggregate Output and Farm Numbers 
The first column of table 1 shows that the infra-marginal subsidy increases production by 5.9 
percent and the number of farms by 4.2 percent in the short run. In the long run, production 
increases less, but farm numbers increase more than in the short run. The baseline for the short 
run differs from that of the long run; the baseline is the farms that would be in business without 
the support. While more farms produce absent the payment in the short run than in the long run, 
the infra-marginal payments deters exit for more farms in the long run. But the latter need not be 
the case; the outcome depends on cost structures and size distribution of farms, as well as the 
size of the infra-marginal payment relative to the market price and the level of infra-marginal 
output receiving support. Since the infra-marginal policy is taxpayer financed, it does not lead to 
an additional consumption distortion. Thus, all additional output associated with the policy will 
be exported at the world price, leading to an increase in exports equal to the increase in output.  
Impact of Revenue Pooling on Aggregate Output and Farm Numbers 
The last two columns of table 1 indicate that revenue pooling leads to higher production 
distortions and a larger increase in the number of farms than the MILC program. Revenue 
pooling increases production by 8.0 percent and the number of farms by 8.7 percent in the short 
run. In the long run, the difference in the effects of the two policies is even more apparent. 
Revenue pooling increases production by 20.6 percent and the number of farms by 30.9 percent, 
in the long run. One reason for the large difference in effects is that the transfer to farms under 
the revenue pooling scheme is approximately six times the transfer to the farms under the MILC 
program. In addition, the increases in production and farm numbers for the infra-marginal 
payment calculations uses the baseline of farms receiving the blend price for all production, 
where the blend price calculation uses world price as the baseline.  The justification for using   24 
different baselines is this is the manner in which the policies are actually applied. Farms receive 
the blend price and make production decisions by equating this price with marginal cost, which 
causes an increase in production above what would be observed if farms received the world 
price. In addition to the blend price, we observe additional distortions due to the infra-marginal 
policy.   
Impact of Revenue Pooling on Aggregate Consumption 
Domestic consumption of fluid milk, Class I, accounts for 39.3 percent of total production, while 
53.3 percent of production is consumed domestically as dairy products and the remaining 7.4 
percent is exported at the world price. The revenue pooling policy not only distorts U.S. 
production, it also distorts U.S. consumption. Table 2 shows consumption distortions associated 
with the price blending policy. The table shows how consumption would change if consumers 
were able to purchase fluid milk and products at the world price instead of class prices. We find 
that price blending leads to a 9.7 percent reduction in consumption of fluid milk, a 22.8 percent 
reduction in the consumption of dairy products and an overall reduction in consumption of 17.3 
percent. This further distorts trade by widening the gap between domestic consumption and 
domestic production.  
Combining the production and consumption distortion, the total increase in exports is 
87.2 million cwt. or a 129.3 percent increase in the short run.  In the long run, exports increase 
by 493.8 percent.   
Impact of Export Subsidy on Aggregate Consumption 
The last two columns of table 2 show how consumption would change if all domestic 
consumption occurred at the blend price instead of at the respective class prices. In this case, we 
find the consumption of fluid would increase by 2.5 percent, while the consumption of products   25 
would decline by 3.0 percent. The overall change in consumption would be a decline 0.7 percent. 
Thus, indicating that the wedge between consumer prices and producer prices also has a trade 
distorting effect. If both producers and domestic consumers faced the same price, namely the 
blend price, exports would exceed there free trade level by 66.8 million cwt.    
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
The panels in two recent high profile trade disputes concluded that price discrimination with or 
without price pooling constituted an export subsidy. At this time, the WTO legal texts do not 
account for these types of consumer only financed export subsidies. We have shown that price 
discrimination without revenue pooling in the form of infra-marginal support can lead to 
substantial output distortions due to cross-subsidization and exit deterrence. Price discrimination 
with price pooling also leads to production and consumption distortions. These distortions exist 
even if a portion of domestic consumption occurs at the world price.  
  Given these results, the panel in the Canada dairy case should have ruled that Class Vabc 
was subsidized. The panel determined Class Vd and Class Ve to be subsidized but Class Vabc 
was not, because the latter could also be accessed by processors for the domestic market, and 
therefore was not “contingent upon export performance.” Consequently, the current definition of 
an export subsidy which requires a benefit to be conferred, the benefit to be contingent upon 
exports and the benefit to be financed by the government is somewhat misleading. Future trade 
agreements and trade negotiations should use the modified definition of an export subsidy which 
includes the dual effect of contracting domestic consumption and escalating domestic 
production. Thus, the WTO could better recognize these more subtle forms of export subsidies. 
  Using the U.S. dairy industry as an empirical example, we find that the distortions in 
output and consumption due to revenue pooling are large. The combined production and   26 
consumption effects lead to significant increases in exports. The production distortion due to 
revenue pooling is substantially larger than the distortion due to the infra-marginal subsidy. 
However, the transfer to farms under the revenue pooling policy is much larger than that under 
the infra-marginal subsidy. The combined effects of the two programs indicate that the effects of 
subtle export subsidies, not currently recognized in the GATT texts can be significant. In many 
cases, these export subsidies can be more distorting than traditional taxpayer financed export 
subsidies currently disciplined by the WTO and to be phased out according to recent 
developments in the Doha negotiations. 
  This paper shows, both in theory and empirically, consumer only financed export 
subsidies or other policies leading to cross-subsidization can cause significant trade distortions. 
Therefore, the results presented have implications for future trade disputes and trade 
negotiations. Modification of the WTO definition of an export subsidy is necessary to capture 
these subtle forms of export subsidies. Had the WTO recognized that export contingency is not a 
necessary condition for exports to be subsidies, the panel in the Canadian dairy case would have 
ruled that Class Vabc was also subsidized.  
 














Figure 1: Cross-subsidization and exit deterrence with infra-marginal support   28 
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Table 1. Effects of Infra-marginal Subsidies and Price Blending on Production Levels and 
Number of Farms. 
Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run
Increase in
   Production (Million Cwt.) 54.2 34.3 72.7 175.4
         Percent of Production 5.9 4.4 8.0 20.6
   Number of Farms 531 586 1,108 3,480





Table 2. Effects of Price Blending and Export Subsidies on Consumption Levels. 
Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run
Change in
   Consumption of Fluid 
        (Million Cwt.) 3.5 3.2 0.9 0.8
         Percent of Fluid 
              Consumption   9.7 9.7 2.5 2.5
   Consumption of Product
        (Million Cwt.) 11.1 10.4 -1.5 -1.4
         Percent of  Product 
              Consumption   22.8 22.8 -3.0 -3.0
   Total Consumption 
        (Million Cwt.) 14.5 13.6 -0.6 -0.6
         Percent of Totat 
              Consumption   17.3 17.3 -0.7 -0.7
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